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Effective Quantum Field Theories (EFTs) are effective insofar as
they apply within a prescribed range of length-scales, but within that
range they predict and describe with extremely high accuracy and
precision. The effectiveness of EFTs is explained by identifying the
features – the scaling behaviour of the parameters – which lead to ef-
fectiveness. The explanation relies on distinguishing autonomy with
respect to changes in microstates (autonomyms), from autonomy with
respect to changes in microlaws (autonomyml), and relating these, re-
spectively, to renormalisability and naturalness. It is claimed that the
effectiveness of EFTs is a consequence of each theory’s autonomyms
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1 Introduction
Effective Quantum Field Theories (EFTs) only apply within a prescribed
range of length-scales, but within that range they may predict and describe
with extremely high accuracy and precision: this is the effectiveness of EFTs
which I seek to explain in this paper.
The title question is a special case of the more profound question: how
is higher-level science possible at all? Answering the question in this more
restricted context should help to provide clues regarding more general an-
swers. In particular, while effective theories are ubiquitous throughout
physics – any given theory will have limits to its applicability – a discussion
of EFTs will allow for progress because the physics here is sufficiently math-
ematised that we may identify the particular theoretical property which ac-
counts for the effectiveness of the theories. The title question is, moreover,
interesting in its own right: one of our most fundamental theories – the
standard model of particle physics – is an EFT; and there is already a small
but live debate in the philosophy literature concerning various aspects of
EFTs.1
Two related questions, each of which has broader implications for the
debates concerning inter-theoretic relations, are addressed below. The first
question corresponds to the title: what about EFTs underlies their effective-
ness? By ‘effective’, I mean to refer to the empirical success of EFTs within
an explicitly delimited domain; the effectiveness of EFTs implies that when,
say, energies are too high, or distances too small, the theory will generate
inaccurate predictions. The question is how EFTs may be empirically suc-
cessful despite leaving out details which are relevant at shorter distances
and higher energies.2 What accounts for the freedom to abstract from such
1See e.g. Butterfield (2014), Castellani (2002), Crowther (2015), Hartmann (2001), and
Williams (2015), and references therein.
2Note that this is distinct from the prior question concerning the empirical success of
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details with negligible loss of predictive power? Answering this question is
central to many aspects of the reduction-emergence debate, which consider
how lower-energy abstractive descriptions arise.
In order to address the title question, a second related question must
be answered: how do the low-energy and high-energy EFTs relate to each
other? In what sense might it be said that the low-energy theory floats free
from the high-energy theory? I’ve noted that the low-energy theory may
leave out details relevant at higher energies, but in order to understand
what allows such details to be discarded, it’s necessary to establish which
details are in fact left out.
To answer these questions, I appeal to two theoretical properties of
EFTs: renormalisability and naturalness. Renormalisable theories are those
where parameters at low energy may be redefined so as to take into account
details relevant at high energies; while natural theories are those where
the parameters at low energies are insensitive to putative changes in pa-
rameters at high energies. A principal aim of this paper is to unpick the
differences between these properties. The question of how EFTs float free
from one another is further motivated by considering the following puzzle.
As just noted, EFTs may be renormalisable and/or natural: however, both
renormalisability and naturalness are generally thought to make theories
autonomous: how, then, is it possible that some theories are renormalis-
able and unnatural?
The puzzle is resolved by distinguishing two types of autonomy: auton-
omy from microstates (autonomyms) corresponds to invariance of the dy-
namics of a low-energy theory with respect to certain changes in the state
at high energy – changes consistent with the high-energy dynamics; au-
tonomy from microlaws (autonomyml) is invariance of the low-energy dy-
namics with respect to certain changes in the high-energy theory – changes
in its laws or fixed parameters. I claim that renormalisability, together
with a separation of mass scales, leads to autonomyms, while naturalness
leads to autonomyml. Thus, unnatural renormalisable theories are those
which are autonomousms but not autonomousml. This distinction also al-
lows the title question to be addressed: the effectiveness of EFTs – the fact
that EFTs may be successful despite leaving out details relevant at higher-
energy scales – is a consequence of their autonomyms, but is independent
of their autonomyml. As such, renormalisability accounts for the effective-
scientific theories in general; in this paper I presume but do not discuss realism about em-
pirically successful EFTs.
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ness of EFTs. I go on to claim that renormalisability may be explained by
the scaling behaviour of the theoretical parameters.
An intriguing consequence of this discussion is that autonomyms (and
hence renormalisability) does not entail a total decoupling of physics at
different length-scales. Unnatural EFTs exhibit extremely sensitive depen-
dence between theoretical parameters defined at vastly different length-
scales. I argue that renormalisability may lead to the effectiveness of even
unnatural EFTs. Thus, the properties of the descriptions at different length-
scales may turn out to be sensitively related even while the dynamics de-
couple. Thus, the properties of the descriptions at different length-scales
may turn out to be sensitively related even while the dynamics decouple.
Discussions of emergence and reduction in the philosophy of physics often
emphasise that lower-energy descriptions exhibit autonomy with respect
to higher-energy science. The discussion in this paper and, in particular,
the distinction between two types of autonomy, clarifies the sense in which
lower-energy science may exhibit such autonomy: autonomy sufficient for
emergence is compatible with sensitive dependence between length-scales.
Distinguishing between these senses of autonomy also contributes to the
dialectic concerning the relations between EFTs and emergence; see e.g.
Bain (2013b), Butterfield (2014), Castellani (2002), and Crowther (2015).
In §2 and §3, I discuss renormalisability and naturalness respectively; an
example of an unnatural, renormalisable theory is given in §3.1. In §4, I dis-
tinguish ways in which a theory might be autonomous from an underlying
theory, and thus answer the question ‘in what respect do low-energy EFTs
float free of the corresponding high-energy theories?’ This sets the stage
for §5’s claim (pace assumptions made in Williams (2015)) that it is renor-
malisability not naturalness which answers the question ‘what allows low-
energy theories to abstract from details salient at higher energies?’; thus the
effectiveness of EFTs is explained.
Two terminological comments: first, Hartmann (2001) discusses whether
EFTs are best thought of as theories, models or sui generis scientific struc-
tures; I find that discussion illuminating, but for ease of reading I refer
to EFTs as ‘theories’ throughout. Second, standard philosophical talk of
higher and lower levels is inconsistent with standard physics usage. Thus, I
talk of low-energy, large length-scale theories and high-energy, short length-




In §4 I argue that renormalisability leads to the autonomyms which accounts
for the effectiveness of EFTs. In this section I define renormalisability and
discuss what features in the world renormalisability tracks. The physics
here is fairly schematic, the aim is not to teach effective field theory, for that
see e.g. Petrov and Blechman (2016). I start by defining renormalisation
and renormalisability, I go on to discuss effective renormalisability, and, in
§2.1, I consider what explains renormalisability.
In all cases I restrict discussion to renormalisation and renormalisabil-
ity in the framework of perturbation theory. See e.g. Berges, Tetradis, and
Wetterich (2002) for details of the physics of non-perturbative renormalis-
ability; while a philosophical discussion of this topic would be interesting,
it’s not clear that the claims made here would straightforwardly carry over.
Thus, for the purposes of this paper, I focus on the perturbative domain,
which has also been the primary focus of the philosophical literature on this
topic. Further work on non-perturbative renormalisability should build on
the conceptual progress made here.
Renormalisability is crucial to the effectiveness of EFTs because it lim-
its a given theory’s dependence on higher-energy physics: a renormalis-
able high-energy theory affects the corresponding low-energy theory only
by way of finitely many modifications to the theory’s parameters. Thus
the dynamics decouple and an effective theory may be developed without
requiring the input of detailed knowledge concerning high-energy goings-
on.
Equation (1) gives the Green’s function for a generic quantum field the-
ory involving fields φ with momenta p1, . . . , pN , masses m, M , and cou-
plings g and gH , µ stands for the energy at which the system is probed. The
Green’s function is central to extracting the probabilities for outcomes in
scattering experiments.
GN (p1, . . . , pN ; g, gH ,m,M, µ)
= 〈0|φ(p1) . . . φ(pN ) |0〉full theory (1)
This theory is well defined only if it is regularised at some high-energy
cutoff scale ΛH , which serves as the upper limit on integration and elim-
inates certain problematic divergences. Renormalisation is the procedure
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whereby various terms in the theory may be redefined such that they take
account of this cutoff. This allows for the further step of removing the cut-
off without bringing back divergences. One may understand the processes
of regularisation and renormalisation as a procedure for demarcating the
expected applicability of the theory: it will only apply at energies signifi-
cantly below the cutoff scale (E  ΛH ).
If one then considers a lower energy regime where E < M andM is the
mass of the heavier particle, we may transition to a theory corresponding
to equation (2) below. In this equation, terms referring to M and the heavy
coupling gH are integrated out and the couplings and mass terms for other
particles represented by g and m are redefined. This redefinition is crucial,
and corresponds to an additional renormalisation procedure.
G∗N (p1, . . . , pN ; g
∗,m∗, µ)[1 +O(1/ΛL)]
= 〈0|φ∗(p1) . . . φ∗(pN ) |0〉 [1 +O(1/ΛL)] (2)
In the low-energy theory ΛL ∼M is now the cutoff scale and the theory
is thus applicable at energies significantly below that scale. Once the the-
ory has been renormalised with the new cutoff, and a low-energy effective
theory has been defined, the cutoff may once again be removed; this does
not return us to the old theory because the intermediate integrating-out of
high-energy terms and subsequent renormalisation define a new theory.3
One may understand a quantum field theory by considering the full
Lagrangian as a sum: L =
∑
n Ln. Each Ln corresponds to an order of the
perturbative expansion of the Lagrangian. Insofar as perturbation theory
is valid (which is all that’s of concern in this paper), each higher order is
of decreasing relevance. The perturbative expansion is in general infinite,
as such any evaluation will involve a truncation at some order and, conse-
quently, a degree of approximation. However the contribution of neglected
higher orders often leads to discrepancies far smaller than those which may
be experimentally measured.
Renormalisation involves appeal to renormalisation group (RG) equa-
tions; in principle these probe the relationship between theoretical param-
3This is somewhat simplified: in general one applies Gell-Mann’s ‘totalitarian principle’
which demands that all operators not ruled out by symmetry principles be included for
each new theory; see Grinbaum (2008) for a discussion.
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eters as some control parameter is varied.4 In the context of quantum field
theory, that control parameter is the length-scale, or, equivalently, the en-
ergy.5 RG equations track the changes in parameters as the energy or dis-
tance cutoff is changed; alternatively, where the cutoff is modelled as plac-
ing the system on a lattice, renormalisation may be understood to re-model
the system on lattices with different minimal spacings.
Renormalisation is, in fact, rather messier than the abstract description
just given. A theory’s Lagrangian may be expressed as a sum of operators,
with the theory’s parameters included as coefficients of those operators.
In order to recover appropriate parameter values as the cutoff is lowered,
counterterms are introduced which are constrained to match renormali-
sation conditions. The counterterms may be subtracted from the original
terms in such a way that the theory is re-expressed as a sum of operators
with only the values of the parameters having varied.6 The introduction of
counterterms and subsequent reparameterisation allows the construction
of a theory which putatively describes the world in a different energy do-
main from that of the original theory. However, the complex mathematical
process just described does not work for all theories; the theories for which
it works are termed ‘renormalisable’. Renormalisable theories are defined
as those which allow the cancellation of divergences by a finite number of
counterterms.
An important feature of renormalisable theories is that, at low energy,
the high-energy terms don’t show up explicitly; rather all effects of high-
energy scales are absorbed into the redefinition of the mass and coupling
parameters. For a given theory, at a given scale, such parameters are fixed;
thus, if a theory is renormalisable, changes at high energies consistent with
4In practice one must often appeal to experimentally sourced information in order to set
various theoretical parameters.
5Note that RG equations are interpreted differently in quantum field theoretic (QFT)
contexts from those used in condensed matter physics: for some condensed matter systems,
the control parameter may be the temperature – this means that we may empirically track
how particular systems’ evolution is described by an RG flow. In QFT contexts we can’t
change the scale but we can probe the system at different energies. Thus we can track the
RG flows which describe parameters’ change with a set of different experiments at various
energies.
6The introduction of counterterms will differ on different renormalisation schemes. Bain
(2013a) argues that the choice of such a scheme is consequential, however, while certain
schemes allow for greater mathematical tractability, whether or not a theory counts as renor-
malisable is scheme-independent, thus Bain’s concerns are orthogonal to issues at stake
here.
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the high-energy dynamics will not affect the low-energy description.7 It is
this aspect of renormalisability which allows for autonomyms, see §4: while
the theory depends on and, indeed, is generally derived from a higher-
energy theory, the dynamics may decouple.
Compare equations (1) and (2): the effective theory is renormalisable
insofar as all effects of M and gH can be absorbed into redefinitions of the
parameters g → g∗ andm→ m∗; thus the effective theory is renormalisable
in the limit as ΛL →∞. Sending the cutoff to infinity allows for mathemat-
ical tractability and, as will be discussed shortly, can be used to remove
non-renormalisable contributions.
A variety of interpretative issues accompany discussions of renormali-
sation in QFT. While I won’t discuss these in detail here, it’s worth flagging
some relevant issues. The modern conception of renormalisation owes a
great deal to the work of Kenneth Wilson and collaborators (see e.g. Wil-
son and Kogut (1974)). David Wallace (2011) builds on this to argue that
the best way to understand renormalisation is that all QFTs are EFTs (with
limited domains of applicability), and that the otherwise odd process of
subtracting infinities is better understood as a procedure undertaken with
the aim of ensuring mathematical tractability. James Fraser (2017) elabo-
rates on this point and argues that the fact that cutoffs are generally taken
to their infinite limit does not warrant viewing these models as continuum
models – rather we should view the infinite limit as allowing for approxi-
mations to the intractable finite theories. Effective theories thus generally
display two approximations, one due to the truncation of their perturba-
tive expansion, as discussed above, and the other due to sending the cutoff
to infinity and consequently eliminating terms which depend on inverse
powers of the cutoff; both approximations are often sufficiently small that
the theories lead to extremely accurate predictions.
The accounts due to Wallace and Fraser apply straightforwardly to renor-
malisable theories. Below, I consider EFTs which are not traditionally renor-
malisable. In such cases, while we take the infinite limit for certain terms
in certain calculations, we may also maintain finite-valued cutoffs in order
to take account of the contribution of non-renormalisable terms. Fraser’s
claims are further evidenced in these contexts, for such EFTs are explicitly
not to be regarded as continuum theories.
7Changes in high-energy parameters would affect the low-energy description, but such
changes are dynamically impermissible.
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How may one establish whether a theory is renormalisable? The renor-
malisation group is crucial here: it provides a schema for probing parame-
ter variation over a range of length-scales without requiring evaluation of
the theory at each scale involved. RG equations generate a flow which al-
lows for the classification of operators into classes termed ‘relevant’ and ‘ir-
relevant’ according to how their contributions vary as the flow approaches
a fixed point.8 Theories with non-trivial fixed points are renormalisable if
there are scales at which the irrelevant operators vanish. The RG is thus
a framework for determining renormalisability since the RG can provide
information about higher-order terms without explicit calculation.9
Renormalisable theories are such that one can change the length-scale,
adjust finitely many parameters and the theory still purports to describe
the world. Thus, a renormalisable theory does not describe the world at all
scales, but its renormalisability means that it can, in principle, slot into a
level-based description at any level.10 On the other hand, EFTs which are
not traditionally renormalisable are only usable within a certain range of
length-scales; beyond their so-called ‘breakdown scale’ they may fail to be
perturbatively tractable or lead to violations of unitarity.
In fact, the connection between a cutoff and non-renormalisability is not
accidental. Anthony Duncan (2012, p. 653) notes that: “any physically sen-
sible theory should include a cutoff at some high-energy/momentum scale,
and that the necessary result of such a cutoff was the appearance of an in-
finite number of operators including the baleful non-renormalisable ones”.
While the cutoff remains finite, the non-renormalisable operators will not
go to zero. Thus effective theories with finite cutoffs will be traditionally
non-renormalisable.
However, there is a weaker condition which non-renormalisable EFTs
may satisfy. This I call ‘effective renormalisability’. As noted above, a the-
ory’s Lagrangian may be expressed as a sum of Lagrangians. Each La-
grangian will contain operators which may be assigned numbers known as
the degrees of divergence: if the degree of divergence of its operators is too
high (usually greater than 4), then the Lagrangian, in the traditional sense,
8Operators may also be marginal – it is more difficult to assess the divergence behaviour
in this case.
9See Polchinski (1984) for a proof of the efficacy of this approach for perturbative renor-
malisability.
10For my purposes, I define theory identity as follows: a single theory may have parame-
ters with different values at different scales, the theory would only count as a new theory if
we eliminate certain terms, such as the mass and coupling terms for high-energy particles.
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counts as non-renormalisable.11 The procedure which assigns degrees of
divergence to operators is known as ‘power counting’.
If we are able to organise the theory’s Lagrangians in order of increasing
degree of divergence, so L = Ld + Ld+1 + Ld+2 + . . . , then the theory may
be effectively renormalisable. This is because, for some high-energy cutoff
Λ, we may be assured that the Lagrangian will scale as 〈Ld+n〉 ∼ (E/Λ)n
where E is the energy scale at which the system is measured. Such terms
will not diverge so long as E  Λ for n > 0.
If a theory is traditionally renormalisable then, to any order, only finitely
many corrections are required to cancel the theory’s divergences. Theo-
ries which are not traditionally renormalisable and, thus, require infinitely
many corrections to cancel all of their divergences, may nonetheless be ef-
fectively renormalisable. Within their domain of applicability, to a given
order in the energy-momentum expansion of the theory, effectively renor-
malisable theories only require finitely many corrections to cancel their di-
vergences. That is, counterterms or equivalent can be constructed such
that, order by order, they result in a theory with non-renormalisable terms
which are proportional to inverse powers of the cutoff. Effectively renor-
malisable theories will thus have finite predictions for low energies, but un-
controlled contributions beyond the breakdown scale, at which point we do
not expect the theory to generate physically meaningful predictions. While
this distinction has not been much discussed in the philosophical literature,
it is well known in the physics literature; Matthew Schwartz (2014, p. 392)
observes that:12
[a]s long as we are only interested in physics at low energy,
only a finite number of terms in this [infinite] series will be im-
portant. Thus, we can fit those terms with a few measurements
and then predict the complete momentum dependence. In this
way, the [traditionally] non-renormalizable theory is predictive
even at tree-level.
While one can often discover fixed points and thus establish the renor-
malisability of a given theory, rigorous demonstration of effective renor-
11Non-renormalisable operators will be classed as irrelevant if the theory in question lies
in the basin of attraction of a fixed point.
12See also Stewart (2014, p. 9).
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malisability is much harder to come by.13 Effective renormalisability is as-
sessed by appeal to power counting schemes tailored to each theory. These,
to some extent, have to be justified empirically – van Kolck (2002) details
how a particular power counting technique for chiral EFT is justified on the
basis of both calculations and empirical comparison. Note that many ques-
tions over the status of effectively renormalisable theories have not yet been
settled. For example, there are ongoing discussions concerning the validity
of particular power counting schemes within the chiral EFT community;
see e.g. Epelbaum and Meißner (2013) and Nogga, Timmermans, and van
Kolck (2005).
Such complexities are no doubt interesting, but can be put to one side
for our present purposes. While it’s difficult to work out if a given EFT is ef-
fectively renormalisable or not, any theory which is not, at least, effectively
renormalisable, is inadequate for the EFT project and generally calculation-
ally intractable. In §4 I relate renormalisability and effective renormalisabil-
ity to autonomyms.
2.1 Explaining renormalisability
Given that I account for the effectiveness of EFTs in terms of their (effective)
renormalisability, I should say what explains renormalisability – otherwise
I might fail fully to answer the title question. In this section, I consider
an explanation of renormalisability suggested by Jeremy Butterfield (2014),
and offer my own competing response.
Butterfield appeals to the fixed point structure of the renormalisation
group (RG) in order to explain theories’ renormalisability; were his claims
accepted, the RG might be seen to provide an alternative answer to the title
question – it is, thus, additionally important that I address his claims.
[T]he modern approach to renormalization . . . explains, in-
deed deduces, a striking feature (namely, renormalizability) of
a whole class of theories. It does this by making precise math-
ematical sense of the ideas of a space of theories and a flow on
the space, called the renormalization group (RG) . . .
13As such, some theories may be termed ‘effectively renormalisable’ in the literature even
while it is not established that their terms can be arranged in order of increasing degree of
divergence.
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it is surely uncontroversial that one very satisfying way to
explain the good fortune reported at the end of section III.1 [that
our best QFTs are renormalizable] would be to show, not merely
that some given theory is renormalizable, but that any theory, or
more modestly, any of a large and/or generic class of theories,
is renormalizable.
[Butterfield (2014, pp. 14, 25-26), original emphasis]
Butterfield asks why our best theories are renormalisable, and responds
that almost all theories at low energies are renormalisable. The demonstra-
tion relies on deriving that, as theories are evaluated at lower energies, the
contribution of non-renormalisable terms dwindles, and all that’s left are
the renormalisable terms; many theories which are otherwise distinct away
from a fixed point will converge on the same renormalisable theory at the
fixed point. Butterfield argues that this result follows directly from the na-
ture of RG flows, and he acknowledges that it depends on the non-trivial
fact that “interactions that are strong at short distances should be weak at
long distances” (ibid., p. 27).
As the nature of this explanation is not entirely clear in Butterfield’s ar-
ticle, I think it worth examining further. The RG qua mathematical frame-
work seems ill-suited to provide a sufficient explanation of renormalisabil-
ity. While the RG allows for the mathematical expression of facts about
renormalisability, the mathematical derivation of renormalisability is bet-
ter described as a codification rather than an explanation. However, this
codification does allow us to identify the features responsible for renor-
malisability. For example, the demonstration of the convergence of RG
flows to an infrared fixed point tells us that a class of theories, all of which
are renormalisable have a particular commonality: they have parameters
which have diminishing value as we move to lower-energy descriptions.
If a theory is renormalisable, its parameters change with scale in just
such a way that they can be absorbed when constructing a lower-energy
theory. The renormalisability of successful theories is explained by the fact
that structures in the world have particular features: that the mass values
and coupling strengths scale appropriately. The convergence of the RG
flows allows us to recognise this explanation. Thus we may view the RG
as a mathematical framework which allows us to establish whether or not
a given theory is renormalisable, and what that renormalisability depends
on.
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There are two further reasons to consider the RG as codifying rather
than explaining renormalisability. The first is that the fixed point structure
of the RG is not generic: there are many theories, not least those which are
effectively renormalisable, for which the fixed points correspond to unre-
alistic non-interacting theories. As such, the properties of renormalisabil-
ity and effective renormalisability apply more generally than the RG fixed
point analysis.
Although fixed point arguments do not always apply, the explanation
of renormalisability and effective renormalisability may be unified as sug-
gested above: theories which describe the world are (effectively) renormal-
isable if their theoretical parameters scale appropriately. This allows a the-
ory to include the effects from other energy scales in reparameterisations.
My second concern with RG arguments relates to a particular formu-
lation of the RG explanation. The existence of an RG infrared fixed point
tells us that whatever the value of the couplings in the high-energy theory,
many theories will converge on the same low-energy description. Thus,
one might argue, the existence of RG flows guarantees that many different
theories are renormalisable. As noted above, this argument form allows us
to identify what’s responsible for renormalisability, but the convergence of
flows does not by itself explain renormalisability. This is because there is
only one system which in fact flows to a given fixed point.
Unlike in the context of continuous phase transitions and the universal-
ity of critical phenomena, where common behaviour is exhibited by mul-
tiple distinct physical systems, there is not, in general, common behaviour
for distinct physical systems described by EFTs; the only universality in
this case is that between the actual system, and a number of hypothetical
systems with varying behaviour away from the fixed point. So, the con-
vergence of flows is a mathematical rather than a physical phenomenon.
For phase transitions, the convergence of RG flows plays an explanatory
role insofar as each convergent trajectory can be shown to correspond to
a different system tending towards the same fixed point, in the EFT case
different physical systems tend towards different fixed points and exhibit
different scaling behaviours.14 These observations demonstrate that the
convergence of RG flows relates differently to the renormalisability of EFTs
than to the universality of critical phenomena.15
14See e.g. Batterman (2017) and Franklin (2018) for contrary analyses of similar appeals
to the RG in explanations of universality.
15This is not to suggest that EFT-described systems never exhibit universality, rather that
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My disagreement with Butterfield’s explanatory claim may be associ-
ated with a distinction between two kinds of explanation. Laudan (1990,
p. 55) considers the following question “why are Olympic runners more
successful than the runners in the local high school?” and observes that this
could either be answered by comparing the anatomies and physiologies of
the respective groups, or by listing the procedures used by the Olympic
selection panels. That each answer might be relevant in different contexts
may provide a way of deflating the debate over the two ways of explaining
renormalisability. The RG flows are akin to selection procedures for dis-
missing non-renormalisable theories, while the anatomy comparison is like
discussion of the parameter scaling. Just as pointing to the selection proce-
dure provides a good answer for why the cohort of Olympic runners does
better than the cohort of school runners, discussion of RG flows provides a
good explanation for why renormalisability is fairly generic amongst EFTs.
The scaling properties, like the account of physiology, provide a better an-
swer to the question about particular theories or runners. So, to explain
why a given theory is renormalisable one ought to discuss its parameter
scaling, just as ‘why is Usain Bolt such a good runner?’ is answered by
considering his training and physiology.
Renormalisability is about how the parameters tracked by our theories
vary relative to each other at different scales. The RG may be used, as
described above, to bring out features of a theory, including the theory’s
renormalisability, and systematically to express such theoretical proper-
ties; although the RG may also play a role in explaining the genericity of
renormalisability among EFTs, claims that this explains particular theories’
renormalisability, or accounts for their effectiveness, are ill-motivated. In-
stead, it is the parameters, including the mass values and coupling strengths,
and the variation of such parameters with changing length-scale, which
better explain a theory’s renormalisability, and, thus, help to explain the
effectiveness of EFTs.
3 Naturalness
Having discussed renormalisability, I turn to naturalness, a term that’s
played a significant heuristic role in the development of various Beyond
universality qua commonality between multiple, actual systems is insufficiently generic to
be relevant to explanations of renormalisability.
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the Standard Model theories in high-energy physics. Naturalness is rele-
vant to the concerns of this paper for two reasons: firstly, Porter Williams
(2015) has suggested that naturalness is closely related to the effectiveness
of EFTs, and, secondly, consideration of the type of autonomy which corre-
sponds to naturalness will allow for the clarification of the sense in which
EFTs at different scales inter-depend.
Naturalness is a tricky concept to define, and seems to be used in a va-
riety of different ways within the physics community. Williams (2015) sorts
through a number of competing definitions and settles on the view that
naturalness is a form of theoretical autonomy: it corresponds to the degree
of sensitivity of parameters defined at low energies to their high-energy
counterparts; thus unnatural theories are those which exhibit incredibly
sensitive dependence of low-energy parameters on high-energy parame-
ters. In this paper, I follow Williams’ definition and will not rehearse the
arguments he considers in its favour.
To get a better handle on the nature of naturalness, consider a pair of
low and high-energy EFTs. As described above, the low-energy theory will
be constructed such that its dependencies on details of the high-energy
theory will only appear in modifications to its coupling parameters. The
values of such parameters are determined by the renormalisation group
equations which take into account the effects due to details at different
length-scales.16 It is standard for such parameters to exhibit logarithmic
sensitivity to the values of parameters at high energies. However, in cases
of unnaturalness, parameters may exhibit quadratic sensitivity.
To see the sensitivity of λ2(ΛL) to the cutoff-scale value λ2(ΛH),
set Λ = ΛL = 105 GeV and the UV cutoff at the Planck scale
ΛH = 10
19 GeV, so that the ratio of scales appearing in the equa-
tion becomes ( ΛLΛH )
2 = 10−28. Now alter the 20th decimal place
of λ2(ΛH), sending λ2(ΛH) → (λ2(ΛH) + 10−20). Plugging this
value for λ2(ΛH) into the above equation shows that this tiny
change in λ2(ΛH) causes the low-energy value λ2(ΛL) to jump
by a factor of 108!
[Williams (2015, p. 87)]
So-called natural theories do not exhibit sensitive dependence of low-
energy parameters on values at high energies. For natural theories the cou-
16In practice, experimental information is often also required.
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plings at very high energies could take a range of values with negligible
impact on experimental results at low-energy scales.
This view of naturalness might face some of the interpretative puzzles
considered in the last section: historically it was believed that the bare mass
and bare couplings defined at high energies represent true properties of
the system and that the renormalisation and introduction of counterterms
correspond merely to radiative corrections. This old view was problematic
because these quantities were infinite in theories where the cutoff is taken
to infinity, and one thus had to engage in the opaque process of subtracting
infinities. The rise of the EFT view is sometimes seen to have resolved
these problems; the EFT view tends to interpret the high-energy couplings
as mathematical devices and the infinities as arising only if the theory is
incorrectly viewed as applying outside its proper energy regime.17
The claim that unnaturalness involves sensitive coupling between scales
may restore the old view that bare parameters are more than mere mathe-
matical devices – that they are, in fact, the parameters of the corresponding
high-energy theory. However, on the EFT view, all these theories are to be
regarded as effective theories; as such, even the high-energy theories are
defined with their own cutoffs and with validity below that cutoff. While
the bare parameters, which are defined at the cutoff, may still be regarded
as mere mathematics, this view allows that there are physically meaningful
parameters defined at high energies below the high-energy cutoff, which
sensitively relate to low-energy parameters. Thus, the high-energy theory
ought not to be conceived of as a continuum model with an infinite cutoff;
instead, following Fraser (2017), we should view the high-energy theory as
having a finite cutoff, and the infinite limit as a way to approximate certain
properties of the finite theory. This step avoids the conceptual problems
which previously arose when renormalisation was viewed as a process for
correcting infinite bare parameters, but allows there to be connections be-
tween parameter values defined at different length-scales.
Before assessing whether or not naturalness accounts for the effective-
ness of EFTs, it’s worth understanding the relation between naturalness
and renormalisability. The following case study makes this clear.
17See Castellani (2002) for a discussion.
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3.1 An unnatural but renormalisable theory
Natural theories may be renormalisable or effectively renormalisable: renor-
malised theories absorb details from high-energy scales into parameters at
low energies. One way this is done is via the specification of high-energy
terms and counterterms. In natural theories, one can vary the terms de-
fined at high energies while leaving the low-energy terms unchanged. As
such, particular high-energy parameters may not be thought of as phys-
ically meaningful. In unnatural theories, the values of the parameters at
high energies are tightly coupled to the values of the renormalised param-
eters at low energies. Note that in many unnatural theories one may pro-
duce counterterms to deal with the unnatural divergences, and, thus, retain
renormalisability.







φ+ λφψ̄ψ + ψ̄(i/∂ −M)ψ (3)
This is a toy theory which describes the evolution and interaction of a
scalar boson (φ) with bare mass m and a fermion (ψ) with bare mass M ;
the particles interact with coupling strength λ. Following Schwartz (2014,
p. 410) we may consider theMS one-loop renormalisation of the mass term
in this theory which leads to equation (4); there the measured pole massmP
is derived from a correction to the renormalised massmMS . In other words,
one may renormalise the bare massm to obtainmMS but further corrections
are required to obtain the experimentally measured value. These further













In equation (4) the pole mass is determined by experiment and used as
a renormalisation condition. Thus, this value does not get corrections at
any order in perturbation theory. But the difference between the pole mass
and the MS mass is determined theoretically as a correction: the difference
is proportional to the square of the mass of the fermions which couple to
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the scalar. The scalar mass gets quadratically divergent corrections, though
these may be removed with counterterms.
This theory may be shown to be renormalisable: we may iterate renor-
malisation and, at each iteration, only finitely many corrections are needed.
However, as the table below shows, this theory is unnatural: the bigger the
separation between the fermion mass M and the experimentally measured
boson mass mP , the greater the correction. That is, the theory exhibits a
very sensitive parameter dependence on high-energy values. So we end
up with a correction of 140% rather than 1% for a change in the boson mass
mp: 125GeV→ 30GeV.
M λ mP mMS m
2
P −m2MS(µ) %
163GeV 0.93 125GeV 123.6GeV (18.6GeV)2 1%
163GeV 0.93 30GeV 72GeV (66GeV)2 140%
Schwartz further analyses what would happen if we took the theory
to have a finite completion at the Planck scale. We would then take Λ ∼
1019GeV. For a boson at 125GeV, this would lead to an extremely sensitive
renormalisation. The renormalised physical mass for the boson is approx-
imately equal to the difference between the high-energy mass and the cut-
off: m2P ≈ m2Planck − Λ2. That gives the high-energy mass as m2Planck ≈
(1 + 10−34)Λ2.
Given that the standard model is unnatural, if no new particles were
to be discovered beyond the standard model and below the Planck scale,
we have what’s called the ‘naturalness problem’, which asks ‘how could
there be such a sensitive dependence between values for couplings at the
Planck scale and empirically accessible scales?’ While further philosoph-
ical analysis of this problem is worthwhile that’s not my focus here. In-
stead I aim to clarify two different senses of ‘sensitive dependence between
length-scales’. One is apparent in cases of unnatural theories, and the other
is found in all (effectively) renormalisable EFTs. Distinguishing between
these two senses is interesting in its own right, and helps identify what ac-
counts for the effectiveness of EFTs. The upshot of this subsection is that
not all (effectively) renormalisable theories are natural.
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4 Two Kinds of Autonomy
In this paper, I consider autonomy with a view to characterising the ways
in which EFTs float free of EFTs defined at different energy scales. In this
section, I explicate two senses of autonomy, which I term ‘autonomy from
microstates’ (autonomyms) and ‘autonomy from microlaws’ (autonomyml).
Having established that renormalisability and naturalness are conceptu-
ally distinct in previous sections, here I pair them with autonomyms and
autonomyml respectively; towards the end of this section I relate autonomy
to emergence and multiple realisability. In §5, I go on to argue that the
effectiveness of EFTs should be understood as a consequence of renormal-
isability rather than naturalness.
Autonomyms licences the development of theories in ignorance of the
goings-on at much higher-energy scales. Where a theory is autonomousms,
we may abstract from dynamics in empirically inaccessible regimes when
testing that theory and constructing a local description of the world.
If one can absorb salient details from high-energy scales into the low-
energy description, then the low-energy description is autonomousms. For
example, the trajectory of a spherical bouncy ball, when dropped, may be
predicted at macroscopic scales on the basis of just a few parameters.18
The internal cohesion and spherical symmetry of bouncy balls makes the
bouncy ball theory autonomousms from details of the particular microstate
of the molecules which constitute the ball. This autonomyms allows the
macroscopic predictions of the bouncy ball theory to be accurate, while the
precise movements of the molecules may be unknown.
Consider, by contrast, dropping a bag containing a collection of bouncy
balls and tacks – this is a collection which may sometimes bounce and
sometimes not bounce depending on the internal alignment of the con-
stituent objects. This combined object will, thus, be chaotic in certain ways:
it would require not only detailed knowledge of fine-grained initial condi-
tions but also knowledge of the microstate and its variations (the relative
movements of each object within the bag) in order to be able to predict
how or if it will bounce. Autonomyms is essential to the abstractions in-
volved in describing a system at a lower-energy scale. Where it’s violated,
as in the bag of balls and tacks case, the macroscopic description allows
18Cross (1999) includes the mass, diameter, coefficient of restitution and spring constant
of the ball.
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for probabilistic predictions at best. This illustrates the role of autonomyms
throughout physics: for example, there may be changes to the high-energy
state consistent with dynamics of beyond the standard model theories, and
it is only our theories’ autonomyms which allows such changes to be disre-
garded at currently accessible scales.
Autonomyms is commonplace across science. A theory is autonomousms
if it is invariant with respect to variations at higher energies such as those
which may differ on different experimental runs but leave the laws un-
changed.19 The autonomyms of the relevant sciences explains how, for
example, expert cell biologists may be ignorant of high-energy physics.
Autonomyms would be violated if we had a strong coupling between en-
ergy scales such that abstraction was impossible (at least without introduc-
ing probabilities). Autonomyms is often violated within a theory, in partic-
ular, if aspects of the theoretical description exhibit inter-scale dependen-
cies.20
Below, I argue that renormalisability leads to autonomyms, and that ef-
fective renormalisability leads to a more constrained form of autonomyms–
in both cases high-energy effects are absorbed into redefinitions of low-
energy parameters.
A regularity which is autonomousml is invariant with respect to changes
in the laws or fixed parameters. That is, autonomyml is autonomy with
respect to (counterlegal) variations which do not occur; such variations
may be imagined to take us to possible worlds with different laws. Where
autonomyms is invariance with respect to changes consistent with the laws,
but which differ on different experimental runs, autonomyml is invariance
with respect to changes which distinguish, at most, different possible worlds.
If a theory is autonomousml then it underdetermines the corresponding
high-energy theory: the high-energy theory may have any of a range of
laws or parameter values, and the world described by the low-energy the-
ory would be unchanged. A striking feature of autonomousml theories is
that the same low-energy theory will apply to multiple worlds which have
different high-energy laws.
19This will include variations in initial conditions and variation due to irreducible
stochasticity.
20Chaotic systems may also violate autonomyms: their dynamics do not allow for a low-
high energy decoupling, nor is it possible determinately to predict the future condition of
some such systems without knowledge of the fine-grained initial conditions.
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If a theory is autonomousms, but it’s compatible with very few high-
energy theories, then it is not autonomousml. Although autonomyms and
autonomyml are conceptually distinct, one might wonder whether any re-
alistic autonomousms theory would violate autonomyml. A consequence
of discussion in the rest of this section is that the case study considered
in §3.1, which is renormalisable but unnatural, is a putative example of
an autonomousms but not autonomousml theory. As such, the present dis-
cussion not only informs us about the nature of EFTs but reveals some-
thing interesting about inter-theoretic relations more generally: not all the-
ories which exhibit extremely sensitive parameter dependence will violate
autonomyms, it turns out that, for putatively realistic theories, autonomyms
and autonomyml may come apart. In any context where inter-theoretic
relations are non-trivial (i.e. excluding cases of strong emergence) there
will be some degree of inter-scale parameter dependence, and consequent
autonomyml violation; however, even those theories which starkly violate
autonomyml may still be autonomousms.
The connection between autonomyms and renormalisability should by
now be fairly straightforward. Assuming a sufficient separation of scales,
renormalisable theories allow for the absorption of details of higher-energy
theories including couplings and mass terms into parameters at low ener-
gies. Thus the dynamics which are relevant to theoretical descriptions at
high energies, are, if the theory is renormalisable, irrelevant at low ener-
gies. Insofar as a theory is renormalisable we may discard details of high
energies and include their effects in modifications at low energies. Thus
renormalisability implies autonomyms:
the dominant effect of integrating out non-renormalizable
operators between a high UV cutoff scale and a low-energy scale
(up to small corrections involving inverse powers of the large
ultraviolet scale) was to produce modifications, potentially of
order unity, in the couplings associated with marginal and rele-
vant operators.
[Duncan (2012, p. 653)]
Once such couplings have been modified, any potential changes due
to the non-renormalisable high-energy operators have been absorbed into
the low-energy theory. Changes at high energies consistent with the high-
energy dynamics are then no longer relevant to an accurate description of
the world at the low-energy scale.
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Importantly, however, a high-energy theory’s renormalisability does
not mean that just any low-energy theory constructed will be able to ab-
stract from high-energy details. In particular, non-renormalisable couplings
may only go to zero once the cutoff is taken to infinity. Autonomyms is spec-
ified with respect to a particular set of variations: if a low-energy theory still
includes non-renormalisable terms, and, as such, not all details from the
high-energy theory can be absorbed, then the theory is not autonomousms
with respect to variation of such details. Theories which are only effec-
tively renormalisable will be autonomousms in a wide variety of contexts –
however, insofar as we may not abstract away from all high-energy details
there will be variations with respect to which the theory in question will
not be autonomousms.
Given that EFTs are renormalisable or effectively renormalisable (other-
wise they’re unusable), we can declare that all EFTs are autonomousms to
some extent. The next step is to think about the sense in which EFT param-
eters depend on parameters of high-energy theories. There are two ways
such dependence could manifest. Firstly, it could be that the high-energy
parameters vary for the same low-energy system on different experimen-
tal runs – it could be that these parameters were sensitive to the goings-on
in the high-energy system. But this would be a failure of autonomyms –
it would mean that the low-energy dynamics were failing to capture some
pertinent aspect of the high-energy dynamics.
The other possible mode of dependence corresponds to the sensitivity
of low-energy parameters to the values of the parameters at high energies.
Such values are, according to our theories, fixed. It is a theoretical assump-
tion that at any given energy scale, the value of the coupling is a particular
number and no known dynamics change this.21
If an EFT is unnatural, then, as argued above, there is an extremely
high degree of sensitivity between far removed energy scales; this sen-
sitivity is certainly troubling to the conception of science whereby theo-
ries are viewed as autonomous in all respects from theories at different
length-scales. However, as demonstrated in §3.1, we may formulate un-
natural renormalisable theories which are, thus, autonomousms but not
autonomousml. Therefore, the only type of autonomy incompatible with
21There are proposals for theories of early universe cosmology which include mecha-
nisms for theory selection – on such theories the laws and parameters may well change;
such theories are, however, speculative, and we have good reason to think that, on time-
scales relevant to EFTs, the laws and parameters are fixed.
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the unnaturalness of theories is autonomyml.
Natural theories are autonomousml because they are not particularly
sensitive to putative variations in high-energy theoretical parameters. As
such, were, per impossibile, the high-energy theoretical parameters to change,
a natural theory’s parameters would be unaffected. All theories, whether
natural or unnatural, will exhibit some dependence on high-energy param-
eter values due to renormalisation, but that dependence will be vanish-
ingly small for natural theories. Autonomyml is invariance with respect to
changes in laws or parameters at high energies, and naturalness, as defined
above, is insensitivity of parameters to parameters at high energies. Thus
natural theories are more autonomousml than unnatural theories.
Having distinguished two kinds of autonomy, it’s worth discussing
how this relates to emergence. This issue is particularly pressing because
emergence is generally presumed to involve autonomy. Indeed, Karen
Crowther (2015) defends the view that emergence is “novelty and auton-
omy of the low-energy level compared to the high-energy level” (Crowther
(2015, p. 421)).22 Crowther claims that a lower-energy theory is autonomous
from the relevant high-energy theory if “it is impervious to changes in the
high-energy system . . . [i]n the physical examples discussed here, auton-
omy stems from the high-energy theory being severely underdetermined by
the low-energy physics” (ibid., p. 433 , original emphasis).
Thus, it seems that Crowther does not distinguish between autonomyms
and autonomyml; as such her view may have the (unfortunate) consequence
that only natural EFTs are to be regarded as emergent. While I endorse
much that she says about EFTs, I propose a friendly amendment to her
view whereby EFTs are emergent if they are novel and autonomousms with
respect to higher-energy theories. To complete the definition, an account of
novelty is needed: the view on offer in Franklin and Knox (unpublished)
suggests that novelty implies that new explanations are available which
are not expressible in terms of the variables of the higher-energy theory.
Autonomousms EFTs may thus be regarded as emergent if they are novel in
this sense.
22Bain (2013a,b) also argues that low-energy EFTs are emergent and autonomous from
their high-energy counterparts, but he links this to in-principle underivability. However,
Bain’s arguments merely establish that a certain class of EFTs (those which appeal to mass-
independent renormalisation schemes) are in-practice underivable. As in-practice under-
ivability is independent of autonomyms, Bain’s autonomy does not allow one to answer
the question of the effectiveness of EFTs, or to comment on the inter-dependence of energy
scales in the same generality as allowed by considering autonomyms and autonomyml.
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Taking the argument of this section together with that of §2.1, I claim
that the scaling properties of parameters explain renormalisability and that
renormalisability leads to autonomyms. Thus, the scaling properties of pa-
rameters explain the autonomy which allows for emergence.
This discussion also bears relations to distinctions sometimes made con-
cerning multiple realisability (MR); see e.g. Bickle (2016) and Hüttemann,
Kühn, and Terzidis (2015). MR may be defined such that phenomena are
multiply realised only if the same phenomenon occurs in at least two dif-
ferent systems where no dynamical process can transform one system into
the other. This may be distinguished from robustness, defined as invari-
ance with respect to dynamically allowed changes. Autonomyms leads
to robustness, and autonomyml makes MR possible. However, explana-
tions which advert to multiply realised phenomena are more desirable than
those which appeal to merely autonomousml phenomena; MR is of inter-
est insofar as there are multiple different systems which exhibit the same
higher-level phenomenon – explanations and theories which refer to that
phenomenon may apply to a broader variety of real-world systems. In-
sofar as unification is an explanatory desideratum, such explanations are
valuable. On the other hand, theories which are autonomousml, but only
apply to one kind of system in the actual world, do not have these explana-
tory advantages.
5 The Effectiveness of EFTs
The last section gave us the distinction between the two kinds of auton-
omy and, thus, a clear answer to the question concerning how low-energy
and high-energy EFTs inter-depend. Now it’s time to return to the question
with which I started: whence the effectiveness of EFTs? By which I mean,
what property explains our capacity to construct theories in ignorance of
the details at higher energies, or to start with some high-energy theory and
discard aspects of the high-energy description in constructing an empiri-
cally successful low-energy theory?
Williams (2015) suggests that the success of the EFT programme pro-
vides grounds to assert the ‘EFT dogma’:
Ultimately, I claim, the reason that failures of naturalness are
problematic is that they violate a “central dogma” of the effec-
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tive field theory approach: that phenomena at widely separated
scales should decouple. This central dogma is well supported
both theoretically and empirically.
[Williams (2015, p. 87)]
I claim, pace Williams, that the EFT dogma, insofar as it is supported
both theoretically and empirically by the success of the EFT programme,
warrants the requirement that our theories are (effectively) renormalisable
rather than natural. In other words, the aim of constructing effective theo-
ries with limited empirical domains warrants the stipulation that all EFTs
be (effectively) renormalisable. Importantly, a sufficient separation of mass
scales is also required in order for EFTs to be effective; without such a sep-
aration, renormalisability is not sufficient to allow construction of empiri-
cally adequate low-energy theories.
EFTs conceptually require decoupling between length-scales. I have ar-
gued that what’s required for decoupling sufficient to explain the effective-
ness of EFTs is autonomyms, and, thus, (effective) renormalisability.23 An
EFT can violate naturalness and autonomyml while still exhibiting suffi-
cient decoupling to satisfy the EFT dogma. That is, insofar as an EFT is
autonomousms, it may be constructed in ignorance of high-energy physics,
or discard details of such high-energy physics. The autonomyml of a theory
has no bearing on those capacities.
Does naturalness failure imply failure of autonomyms? If the answer to
this question were ‘yes’, then we would need to know very precise details
about the high-energy scales in order to generate predictions from low-
energy unnatural theories. But this is not how unnatural EFTs work. The
high-energy, short-distance facts on which unnatural EFTs depend are the
same in every experiment and there is no theoretical mechanism for mod-
ifying such values. While unnatural theories do violate autonomyml, they
may nonetheless be autonomousms.
I agree with Williams’ identification of the EFT dogma: “the expectation
that widely separated scales should largely decouple in EFTs”. But this
dogma, so stated, is ambiguous. The effectiveness of EFTs which is war-
ranted by the success of the EFT programme, corresponds to autonomyms,
23For EFTs with sufficient separation of scales, renormalisability and autonomyms are co-
extensional, however they are not generally equivalent: not all autonomousms theories need
be renormalisable – for instance it’s not clear what it would mean to claim that cell biology
is renormalisable.
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and is due to (effective) renormalisability and the separation of mass scales.
The decoupling consequent upon autonomyms is sufficient for EFTs only to
apply within a limited range of length-scales. While autonomyml would
correspond to further decoupling of scales, that’s not required for EFTs’
effectiveness.
For renormalisable (and effectively renormalisable) theories, renormal-
isation allows us to absorb the dependencies on high-energy facts into cor-
rections to parameters. Therefore it is the (effective) renormalisability, and
the consequent autonomyms which accounts for the effectiveness of EFTs.
As argued in §2.1, renormalisability is explained by facts about the scal-
ing properties of the couplings, these properties thus help to explain the
effectiveness of EFTs.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I distinguished two theoretical properties – renormalisabil-
ity and naturalness – with a view to evaluating which is responsible for
the effectiveness of EFTs. While (effective) renormalisability allows for an
(effective) decoupling of dynamics, a sine qua non for effectiveness, natu-
ralness corresponds to a decoupling of parameters, which is not in itself
essential to effectiveness.
I related these properties to two types of autonomy. Autonomyms is
an autonomy of low-energy dynamics from changes a system may actually
undergo. Failure of autonomyms implies that the dynamics do not decou-
ple. Autonomyml is rather about a decoupling of laws and parameter val-
ues; such decoupling is not required for the development of predictively
successful low-energy theories. Parameters are fixed for our world, puta-
tive changes are not changes the system may actually undergo. Autonomyms
is thus required for the effectiveness of EFTs, while autonomyml is not.
As we are discussing inter-theoretic relations there will always be some
violation of autonomyml, for there will be some dependence relations be-
tween parameters defined at different length-scales. Unnatural theories are
those theories which violate autonomyml in a particularly stark or extreme
way. I have demonstrated that such violation is nonetheless consistent
with renormalisability. As renormalisability is sufficient for autonomyms,
it is thus consistent for a theory starkly to violate autonomyml but to be
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autonomousms. All renormalisable theories violate autonomyml somewhat,
but only a small subclass of renormalisable theories are unnatural and, as
such, severely violate autonomyml. This distinction allowed me to explain
how EFTs might be renormalisable yet unnatural: such theories will be
autonomousms but not autonomousml.
That theories may be autonomousms and not autonomousml is interest-
ing and non-trivial: it tells us something about the relations between dif-
ferent levels of description. The world may be such that one can construct
successful and accurate low-energy theories in ignorance of high-energy
goings-on, and yet such low-energy theories may strongly constrain details
of the as-yet-undiscovered high-energy theories.
EFTs are effective insofar as they are autonomousms. As renormalisabil-
ity, together with a separation of mass scales is sufficient for autonomyms,
renormalisability accounts for the effectiveness of EFTs. Renormalisability
is not explained by general features of the renormalisation group but, in
each theory, by the scaling behaviour of particular theoretical parameters
such as the coupling and mass terms. Therefore, the structure of the theo-
retical parameters helps to explain the effectiveness of EFTs.
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